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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GARY L. WELBORN, : 
Petitioner / Appellant, 
v. : Case No. 20090720-CA 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS, et al., : 
Respondents / Appellees. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS / APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(I) (West 2009). It was transferred to this Court on 
October 5,2009, pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the Board of Pardons' decision to give Welborn a June 2014 rehearing date 
violate petitioner's constitutional rights by: the procedure that it used; an error made by 
its hearing officer, but not the board, as to how many convictions the petitioner had; use 
of information from Welborn's Presentence Investigation Report in making its decision; 
and failure to follow sentencing guidelines in reaching its decision? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised in the respondents' 
motion for summary judgment. R. 151 -23 7. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The legal reasoning of a court granting an 
extraordinary writ is reviewed for correctness. Rice v. Pi v. of Securities. 2004 UT App 
2l5,1f4,95P.3d 1169. 
2. Based on a copy he received of the district court's computerized docket, which 
showed the wrong date for when respondents were mailed a copy of Welborn's petition, 
petitioner claimed the respondents' motion for summary judgment should be stricken as 
being untimely filed. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's 
motion to strike? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised by the petitioner's motion 
to strike and the board's response thereto. R. 254, 323-24. A motion to strike pleadings 
is addressed to the discretion of the court and will only be overturned by a clear abuse of 
that discretion. Pratt v. Nelson, 2005 UT App 541, [^9, 127 P.3d 1256, remanded on other 
grounds. Pratt v. Nelson. 2007 UT 41, 164 P.3d 366. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's ruling on a motion to strike is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Addendum A to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Gary Welborn filed this petition for extraordinary relief on November 10,2008. 
R. 1-126. Welborn raised five issues in his petition. 
2 
(1) Respondents relied upon incorrect information in reaching a decision 
regarding [Petitioner's] parole date; (2) the rehearing date Respondents set 
for Petitioner was unduly long considering the actual facts of the case; (3) it 
was error for Respondent to refuse to accept evidence from Petitioner but 
then to allow the victim to present testimony; (4) the hearing officer failed 
to review Petitioner's file appropriately which lead [sic] him to believe that 
Petitioner did not accept full responsibility for his crimes; and (5) due to 
State budget cuts, it will take longer than appropriate for Petitioner to 
receive sex offender treatment. 
R. 140 (Minute Entry filed April 24, 2009) (a copy is attached as Addendum B). 
The district court ordered the Attorney General's Office to respond to the first four 
issues raised by the petition, but dismissed the fifth claim as being frivolous on its face. 
R# 140-42. On June 8, 2009, the Utah Board of Pardons and its individual members 
responded to the petition by filing a motion for summary judgment. R. 151-237. 
Welborn moved to strike this motion as being untimely. R. 254. The district court denied 
the motion to strike and granted the motion for summary judgment on August 11, 2009. 
R. 342-49 (a copy is attached as Addendum C). Welborn filed his notice of appeal on 
August 28, 2009. R. 350-51. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Gary Welborn pled guilty to two felonies, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a 
first degree felony, and sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony. He was 
sentenced on July 14, 2004, to two concurrent terms, one of five years to life and the 
other of one to fifteen years. R. 166-67. The Utah Board of Pardons scheduled 
Welborn's original parole hearing for July 26, 2007. Petitioner received notice of the 
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hearing and a copy of the records the board would rely on before the hearing. R. 170, 
175-76. 
Welborn appeared at the hearing, conducted by Hearing Officer Dick Sullivan, and 
spoke on his own behalf. R. 173-205. Petitioner's victim was also present and permitted 
to testify. R. 194-98. While Welborn had been permitted to submit various documents to 
be considered by the board (R. 192-93) he was not allowed to submit evidence that 
challenged the accuracy of the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) that had been 
prepared for use in Welbom's criminal sentencing. R. 186-90. 
[Sullivan:] I characterize the sexual abuse the way it was characterized in 
the Adult Probation and Parole presentence investigation report. I didn't 
just pull that out of the air. And the Adult Probation and Parole, PSI was 
based upon the detective's interview with your daughter and so forth, and 
statements that were made, okay? So you've heard my characterization of 
it. You do want to tell me where you disagree with me, is that right? 
[Welborn] A: No, I don't disagree with you. 
R. 190. The information contained in the PSI supports the hearing officer's statements as 
to what occurred between Welborn and his victim. R. 219-34. 
At the hearing, the hearing officer mistakenly believed that Welborn had pled 
guilty to two first degree felonies and one second degree felony. R. 176-80. Even though 
he believed that petitioner had been convicted of an additional felony, the hearing officer 
informed Welborn that his recommendation to the board would be that petitioner be given 
a December 2010 rehearing date. R. 202-3. 
The board did not follow the hearing officer's recommendation. Instead, it 
scheduled Welborn's rehearing for June 2014. R. 172. In doing so, the board accurately 
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stated that petitioner had been sentenced for one first degree and one second degree 
felony. Id In explaining the rationale for its decision, the board listed eight aggravating 
factors and stated that it found no mitigating ones. R. 237. The Chairman of the board, 
Curtis Garner, testified that the board "did not base any part of its decision on the 
assumption that Mr. Welborn had two life sentences and one indeterminate term of one to 
fifteen years." R. 216. 
On July 28, 2008, pursuant to Welborn's request for a Special Attention Review, 
the board ordered that there be no change to the scheduled rehearing date of June 2014. 
R. 208. In explaining its decision, the board noted that its calculations concerning the 
petitioner were correct "[djespite any perceived mistakes by the Hearing Officer's 
comments at the hearing regarding actual sentences served" and that the PSI contained 
Welborn's admission as to the facts that he now sought to challenge. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner brought this action against the board and its members, asking the courts 
to overturn the board's original parole decision that set a rehearing date for Welborn of 
June 2014. 
No constitutional right of the petitioner was violated by the board's decision. 
Welborn has a limited due process right to be given notice of the date of his original 
parole hearing and access to the material that will be considered by the board at the 
hearing. Petitioner acknowledged verbally and in writing that he had received this due 
process. Nor was the board's decision arbitrary or capricious. The rehearing date is 
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within the applicable indeterminate sentence range and Welborn failed to show any 
unusual circumstances that would make it inappropriate. 
The record does show that the board's hearing officer misunderstood how many 
convictions Welborn had. But the respondents presented evidence that the board did not 
share this misunderstanding. The board's decision was based on accurate information 
and not on any mistake made by the hearing officer. Welborn did not present any 
evidence to the contrary. 
The board based its decision on Welborn's whole record, including information 
contained in the petitioner's PSI. Welborn claimed that the PSI information was 
erroneous. Petitioner should have brought this claim at his criminal sentencing. His 
failure to do so acted as a waiver of his right to challenge the PSI. 
Petitioner claimed that the board failed to follow the proper sentencing guidelines 
in making its parole decision. But such guidelines do not have the force of law and do 
not curtail the discretion of the board. 
Finally, Welborn argues that the respondents' motion for summary judgment was 
untimely. This claim is based on an erroneous date shown on a copy of the district 
court's computerized docket that was mailed to the petitioner. The date's importance 
comes from the district court's order that gave the board thirty days from the service upon 
it of a copy of the petition to respond. The docket was later corrected by the court to 
show the actual date on which a copy of the petition was mailed to respondents. Using 
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t | i e c o r r e c t date9 the respondents9 motion for summary judgment w;i bind) hied and 
petitioner's motion to strike was properly denied 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BOARD OF PARDON'S DECISION DID NOT VIOLATE 
ANY RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER 
Welborn claims that his constitutional i i^ Iit;. wi>«« ^ \ i «t» . i in the manner in which 
the board held his uiiiiai fiarolc hearing, Petitioner bases this claim on his belief that the 
d i .s .* • ; uld have performed a fuller review of not just the procedure used by 11 K 
board, but its substantive decision. 
Utah law mandates that I maul dt t r*i< »"• I» .rmrded great deference and, as a 
general mlc, hoard divisions are not subject to judicial review. Walker v. State, 902 ' • 
] I ^ 150 (Utah App. 1995). Indeed, the board has exclusive authority to ikltinn 
actual number of years a defendant is to serve neece \. iiwuse, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 
1994)(citations omitio, sit as a panel of review on the result, absent 
; T stitutional claim." Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons. 869 F : - 7 
(Utah 1994). 
Only two limited exccpliiMiN ;illo i " lr i (iidicial review of Board decisions: 1) lo 
assure Mutt pnvuliiial dur process was not denied, Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 
870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993) and 2) where there has been a clear HUIM. of id ,» n in •<• \\ aid 
v. Smith, 573 P.2d 781, 7K2 (I Hah IV;M J.I. II» ...t i - • irv .iJdresses "the fairness of the 
process by which llv MOJO i 'iiidnlakes its sentencing function," not the result. Padilla v. 
7 
Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). 
"[T]wo due process requirements must be met in parole grant hearings. First, an inmate 
must receive adequate notice to prepare for a parole hearing. Second, an inmate must 
receive copies or a summary of the information in the Board's file upon which the Board 
will rely in deciding whether to grant parole." Peterson v. Utah Bd. of Pardons. 931 P.2d 
147, 150 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
It is undisputed that Welborn's procedural due process rights wrere not violated. 
He acknowledged that he had been given notice of the hearing and had received the 
documents the board would consider. R. 170, 175-76. 
Nor has Welborn shown that the board abused its discretion in setting a June, 2014 
rehearing date. That this is longer than he would have desired does not make it 
unconstitutional. 
[S]o long as the period of incarceration decided upon by the board of 
pardons falls within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range, e.g., five 
years to life, then that decision, absent unusual circumstances, cannot be 
arbitrary and capricious. 
Preece, 886P.2dat 512. 
Welborn's rehearing date is within the applicable indeterminate sentencing range. 
He did not present to the district court any unusual circumstances that would make the 
board's decision arbitrary and capricious. The district court correctly rejected this claim. 
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u. jLiii. UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE BUAKD 
DID NOT MAKE ITS DECISION BASED ON A MISTAKE OF FACT 
AS TO THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTIONS 
The hearing officer parole hearing misstated the number of 
conviilton*» idr? 1 v 111 r petitioner's incarceration. Petitioner claimed that this error 
invalidated the board's decision. But the hearing officer's error does in»! - »< ^ n,,,i iiierc 
is a question of material fact as to whctlio (lit hniinl ivlml«>n u similar misconception in 
making its parole < iei is11>ii, 
Tlir *lisii'ict court aptly noted that the board's ultimate decision rested on ilit mil 
record and not on the mere misstatements of the hearing o II vi i lm The hearing 
officer conducts the hearing tnut «ii;tL"\ n nr< »minundation to the board. The board is 
chargeu .-J ultimate parole decision. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(1 )(a) 
( :• *•• " »o \ Utah Admin. Code R.671-305-1 (2009). 
The respondents presented evidenu ili.it (lie biurd1'- decision was not based on an 
assumptior .. * • uivicted of two first degree felonies and one second 
< h vw< ihe actual decision of the board correctly stated petitioner's ci iiiiiniil 
convictions I- ~~ The special attention,m\ iev I il J« d that any mistake by 
the hearing office, ; ird's decision, iv. _Ji The board's chairman 
iv u\)\ i! ilii.nl tlir board did not base any part of its decision concerning Welborn on a 
mistaken belief that he had been convicted of an extra first degree 
Indeed, the board did not accept tru . . . •* •• >mmendation, but reached its 
own decision. t< '"/ u,', 
9 
The moving party has the burden of presenting evidence to demonstrate that 
no genuine issue of material facts exists and that judgment as a matter of 
law is proper. However, once the moving party challenges an element of the 
nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence 
that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.. 2002 UT 69, f31, 54 P.3d 1054 (citations 
omitted). The respondents met their burden. They presented evidence that the hearing 
officer's error had not affected the board's decision. Having done so, the burden then 
shifted to Welborn to present evidence that demonstrated the existence of a genuine 
material issue of fact. That petitioner failed to do. No evidence was presented that would 
show the board's decision was based on the hearing officer's mistake. The district court 
correctly determined that the undisputed facts did not support the petitioner's claim. 
III. A RULE 65B PETITION CANNOT BE USED TO CHALLENGE 
THE ACCURACY OF THE PETITIONER'S PSI 
At his original parole hearing, the hearing officer and the board used information 
contained in Welborn's PSI to ascertain the facts surrounding the petitioner's convictions. 
Welborn was not permitted to challenge the accuracy of the PSI. By statute, Welborn had 
the duty to challenge any inaccuracies in the PSI at the time of sentencing. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (West 2009). His failure to do so constituted a waiver of his right to 
challenge this information later. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b) (West 2009); State v. 
Johnson, 2006 UT App 3, f 13, 129 P.3d 282 (challenges to information contained in the 
PSI must be made at sentencing if they are to be preserved for appellate review). 
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The statute require, tli.il flu initnii thy \ < mil determine the accuracy of 
111 n)n ija 11< >n i >" 11(;11111,11 111 in lir (' *<l. fhe board was entitled to rely upon this information 
was not required to permit Welborn to challenge the PSI where he had waived any 
such right and failed to preserve the claim at his criminal senlenunj1 I hv hi rinl
 r, 
explicitly permitted ligibility for parole on an inmate's 
"enmeiiiitf pisl hHtorv." Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902. 908-09 
(Utah 1993). Indeed, administrative proceedings before the board are H •..
 ; I 
the board is allowed to consider charges un nlm li ilir |nr<nm I ht\ hivn acquitted. Johns 
v. Shulsen. ,'I " I" M I ! W, I VV7 IS (Utah 1986) (board was not barred h\ ..nmma • 
acquittal from revoking inmate's parole upon its administrative finding that the inmate 
had committed the underlying crime). 
The district. M„„„| , n m r t h \h Id Hi.il 11 •« hunrd was free to consider the entirety of 
the pelII h fiu'i "s record in.making its parole decision. 
Petitioner's objection to the Board considering his pre-sentence 
report is also unfounded. It is not for the Court to evaluate the content of 
this report, but only to affirm that the pre-sentence report constitutes a 
portion of petitioner's record and is a fair basis from which to glean 
information about petitioner. 
R. 347. 
The district court correctly dismisst should be 
summarily .IH'IHIH d. 
IV. SENTENCING GUIDELINES DO NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF 
LAW 
Welborn claims that the board's decision is invalid because it was longer than the 
term of incarceration that was proposed by certain sentencing guidelines. But petitioner 
had no protected interest in the board following any particular guidelines in considering 
his eligibility for parole. The Utah Supreme Court rejected a similar claim in Monson v. 
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Utah 1996). 
We reject these contentions insofar as they are premised on the 
concept that the Guidelines create a liberty interest or an "expectation of 
release" such that the Board's departure from them could amount to cruel 
and unusual punishment. We have previously said that "any 'expectation of 
release1 derived from the [Guidelines is at best tenuous" because they do 
not have the force and effect of law. . . . If we were to credit Monson's 
argument that the Board's departure from the Guidelines in his and other 
cases amounts to the imposition of an excessive punishment, we would, in 
effect, transform Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme into a scheme of 
determinate sentences fixed by the Guidelines. This we refuse to do. "[S]o 
long as the period of incarceration decided upon by the board of pardons 
falls within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range,. . . then that 
decision, absent unusual circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and capricious." 
Preece, 886P.2dat 512. 
The board was not bound by any sentencing guidelines in reaching its decision 
concerning the petitioner. It gave Welborn the necessary procedural due process. It 
based its decision on the full record before it. The board's decision fell within the 
indeterminate range set by Welborn's criminal sentence. The Parole Board's decision 
did not violate the petitioner's rights. It was not excessive. The district court correctly 
dismissed this claim and that decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
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V. T H E D I S T R I C T COURT CORREI 11 \ I lENIED W E L R O R N ' S 
M O T I O N T O STRIKE 
I ( .'i. k'l ' I \ pnl M ?l Ml°, the district court gave the board thirty days after 
service of the petition to respond. Based on a copy of the district court's docket (R. 336) 
that he had received, Welborn believed that the court had mailed tin- icsp< indents a i n] \y 
of the petition on April *1S, 2(ni{ I riiiiniirr nmvi'il tw « n ike the respondents' motion for 
siiminun |ndgmrn» as being untimely. 
But the docket provided to Welborn "was incorrect. '1 'he docket was later corrected 
to show that the court did not mail a copv o . 
2(1(1*/. Au»[i") u»l IIK Joekel is nll.'irhcd hereto as Addendum D.1 "Hie district court held 
that the respondents"' motion was timely using the correct date of service. R. 344. 
Welborn's motion to strike was based on an error in ilie * mnpuiu i -'i »l dnu mi i i m i 
docket. Utah court "MU MH [H«\\H N< > n r l ' r l m m l errors. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) 
(" (11 T i r • 11 m i s I j I Is c •.'; ni n y be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or 
on the motion of any party"). The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also require m, 
to "disregard any error or delect in ihe pmnviliiij.! uh In <l< r intl I "I • * * ( ( ! c substantial 
riyhl-i il Hit" piiities " Illjth R Civ. P. 61 . 
In this case, the court justifiably relied on the docket date under which the 
respondents' motion was timely. > .»• court was free iu dv leyiud im n u n n I he ilnclul 
1
 This Court can take judicial notice of the trial court's corrected docket. In Re 
F.M., 2002 UT App 340, p n.2, 57 P.3d 1130 (court can take judicial notice of records 
and prior proceedings in the same case). 
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or 
records once it had been corrected because it did not prejudice the petitioner. Even if 
Welborn's Motion to Strike were granted, Rule 55(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure would have precluded the entry of a default judgment against the respondents. 
"No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against any officer 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court." The district court correctly dismissed Welbom's petition on the 
merits. Petitioner could not have established his claim to the satisfaction of the court 
even if his motion had been granted. Because Welborn could not have prevailed, his 
motion was properly denied and that decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, respondents ask this Court to affirm the dismissal of 
this action. 
Respectfully submitted this /&' day of February, 2010. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents / Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I < i- ••• : mat I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondents / Appellees, postage prepaid, to the following on this /"& d;. 
February, 2010: 
Gary L. Welbom 
Inmate #162157 
Central Utah Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 550 
Gunnison, Utah 84634-0550 
Petitioner / Appellant Pro Se 
A 
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ADDENDUM "A 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, a 
person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph 
(b) (involving wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use 
of public or corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of judicial 
authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of Pardons and Parole). 
There shall be no special form of writ. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, the 
procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the 
extent that this rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for 
extraordinary relief shall be governed by the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(b)(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall govern all 
petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court 
may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
(b)(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of 
the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or in which 
the alleged restraint is occurring. 
(b)(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall contain a short, plain statement 
of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and 
the place where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the restraint, if 
known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the restraint has already been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior 
proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner 
that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the pleadings 
filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the restraint. 
(b)(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or 
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two 
copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(b)(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court that 
the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other 
reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue 
an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons for 
this conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall 
be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the 
order of dismissal. 
(b)(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous on its face, the 
court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any 
memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order 
directing the respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time within 
which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an 
order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the 
restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the 
person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person so restrained has been transferred to 
any other person, and if so, the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason 
or authority for the transfer. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit the court 
from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive motion. 
(b)(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removed 
from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing 
order can be enforced, the court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent 
before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the 
court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the custody of such other persons 
as may be appropriate. 
(b)(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it appears 
that a person other than the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the 
hearing order and any other process issued by the court may be served on the person having 
custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been naimed as respondent 
in the action. 
(b)(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of the person alleged to be 
restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the person from 
the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff 
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with according to law. 
(b)(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court shall 
hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or 
other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall state 
the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent to bring before 
it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the right to be present at the 
hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall not be 
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the pelition, if enough is 
stated to impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent. 
(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(c)(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, and when directed to do 
so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in this 
paragraph. Any person who is not required to be represented by the attorney general and who is 
aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may 
petition the court under this paragraph if (A) the person claims to be entitled to an office 
unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this 
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by a person other than the 
attorney general under this paragraph shall be brought in the name of the petitioner, and the 
petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for 
costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties 
shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73. 
(c)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person usurps, intrudes 
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an 
office in a corporation created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer 
does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where persons act as a 
corporation in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated; (D) where any corporation 
has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of 
corporations; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights, 
privileges or franchises. 
(c)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice be 
given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the 
adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary relief in 
accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A. 
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty; actions by board of 
pardons and parole. 
(d)(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by any of the acts 
enumerated in this paragraph may petition the court for relief. 
(d)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person 
has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an 
inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use or 
enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where the Board of 
Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform an act required by 
constitutional or statutory law. 
(d)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice be 
given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the 
adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior court, 
administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to the 
court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in 
accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A. 
(d)(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's 
review shall not extend further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued 
its authority. 
ADDENDUM "B" 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2 4 2009 
SALT LAKE COUNTY I 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTBy. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Deputy Clerk 
]ARY L. WELBORN, 
Petitioner, 
JTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, 
*. al, 
Respondents. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 080923667 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
Date: April 20, 2009 
This matter is before the Court on the Petition for Extraordinary Relief, pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 65B(d).' 
Petitioner raises five, interrelated, causes of action. They are: (1) Respondents relied upon incorrect 
information in reaching a decision regarding Defendant's parole date; (2) the rehearing date Respondents 
set for Petitioner was unduly long considering the actual facts of the case; (3) it was error for Respondent 
to refuse to accept evidence from Petitioner but then to allow the victim to present testimony; (4) the hearing 
officer failed to review Petitioner's file appropriately which lead him to believe that Petitioner did not 
accept full responsibility for his crimes; and (5) due to State budget cuts, it will take longer than appropriate 
for Petitioner to receive sex offender treatment. 
The Court first reviews the Petition to determine if "the legality of the restraint has already been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in the petition... appear[s] frivolous 
on its." Rule 65B(b)(5). In evaluating whether the Petitioner's claims are frivolous, the Court must 
consider the authority it has to review Board of Pardon's actions. The Court generally has no authority to 
review the many of the Board's substantive decisions. "[S]o long as the period of incarceration decided upon 
14. „ „ "Da+*rtr\n&r OC W p l l 2^ " f i t . 
WELBORN V. BOARD OF PARDONS PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
by the board of pardons falls within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range, . . . , then that decision, 
absent unusual circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and capricious." Preece v. House, 896 P.2d 508 512 
(Utah 1994) (citations omitted). However, the Court does have authority to review the "process by which 
the Board undertakes its sentencing function." Id. (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
The Court finds that Petitioner's first four causes of action state claims that appropriately challenge 
the process by which the Board undertook its sentencing function. Although the second cause of action 
challenges the review date Petitioner was given, the challenge is based upon alleged procedural errors. 
Therefore, the first four causes of action are not dismissed. A copy of the Petition will be served upon 
Respondents and they shall have thirty (30) days to respond. 
Petitioner's remaining claim alleges that budgetary cutbacks will prevent him from timely receiving 
sex offender treatment. The Court finds that this claim must be dismissed. First, this claim does not allege 
a wrong committed by the Respondents, the Board of Pardons and its members, and the Respondents cannot 
answer the claim. Second, the prison's budget is a matter for the legislature and not for the Court. 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's first, second, third, and fourth claims are not frivolous and 
warrant response from Respondents. Upon receiving the Petition, Respondents shall have thirty (30) days 
to respond to claims one through four. Petitioner's fifth claim is dismissed as frivolous on its face. 
DATED this^day of April, 2009. 
<u*^u C t & A 
fudg£"Sheila K. McCleve 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that a copy of the Minute Entry was sent to the following, by the following 
method on the 28th day of April, 2009. 
Method 
Mail: 
Name 
Gary Welborn 
Inmate # 33639 
Housing Unit C-3 
Central Utah Correctional Facility 
PO Box 550 
Gunnison, Utah 84634-0550 
Dated this the 28* day of April, 2009. 
Deputy Court (Merle 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARY WELBORN. 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS, 
Respondents. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 080923667 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
This matter came before the Court on the Petition for Extraordinary Relief and 
respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment thereon. Petitioner filed additional motions 
to which respondents submitted a response. The Court having considered all pleadings 
on file, hereby rules as follows. 
BACKGROUND 
The Court has dismissed one of petitioner's claims as frivolous and ordered 
respondent to address the merits of petitioner's other four claims. Respondent filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment asking the Court for summary judgment on those 
remaining claims. Petitioner asks the court to strike the State's motion as untimely and 
to stay the notice to submit for decision to allow him to file an interlocutory appeal on the 
timeliness of the State's motion. The Court having reviewed the pleadings and all 
documents on file, hereby finds and rules as follows. 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Petitioner pled guilty to two felony counts, one of Aggravated Sexual 
Abuse of a Child and one of Sexual Abuse of a Child, July 14, 2004. The Court, Judge 
Lynn Payne, sentenced him to two concurrent, indeterminate sentences in the Utah 
State Prison, of five years to life and one year to fifteen years. Judgment and Order of 
Commitment. Case 031800339 
2. Petitioner received notice of his hearing and a copy of the Board's record 
prior to his hearing. Transcript of Parole Hearing 3 - 4, and Petitioner's Signed 
Acknowledgment of Receipt of File 
3. On July 26, 2007 petitioner appeared at and spoke on his behalf at a 
parole hearing before the Board of Pardons (the Board). ]d. 
4. At the hearing, the Board considered evidence from petitioner as well as 
petitioner's daughter/victim, jd. 
4. On August 7, 2007, for good cause and after the hearing and review of 
information, the Board made and issued a decision to schedule petitioner for a 
subsequent parole hearing in June 2014 and ordered him to successfully complete a 
Sex Offender Treatment Program before that rehearing. Aff. of Curtis Garner and Final 
Decision of the Hearing Held on July 26. 2007. 
5. The Board issued and delivered to petitioner its Rationale for Decision, dated 
July 31, 2007. Rationale for Decision. 
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6. In response to the Board's decision, petitioner submitted information and 
received a Special Attention Review of this decision by the Board wherein the Board 
ordered no change to the June 2014 date. Special Attention Review. 
7. The Petition was filed November 10, 2008. Docket. 
I. Motion to Strike and Motion to Stay 
Petitioner moves to strike respondent's motion as untimely, and claims the Court 
mailed the petition to respondent April 24, 2009 and thus respondent's motion was due 
June 3, 2009. Petitioner misreads the docket in this file and the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Court did not mail the contents of the file until May 11, 2009. See 
Docket. Therefore according to Rules 6 (a) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
respondent's motion was due June 15, 2009.1 The Court received respondent's motion 
June 8, 2009, respondent's motion is therefore timely. The motion to strike and motion 
to stay are therefore denied. 
II. Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). Summary judgment is 
appropriate "when it clearly appears that there is no reasonable probability that the party 
1Thirty days after May 11, plus three days for service is June 15, 2009, not June 3rd nor June 8th. 
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moved against could prevail." Snyder v. Merklev. 693 P.2d 64, 65 (1984). A trial court 
does not weigh facts when considering a summary judgment motion, and only 
determines whether a dispute of material fact exists. Pigs Gun Club. Inc. v. Sanppte 
County. 2002 UT 17, If 24). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 is clear that "[decisions of the Board of Pardons in 
cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, 
or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not subject to judicial review." Any 
judicial review of the Board's decisions "is limited to the 'process by which the Board 
undertakes its sentencing function.'" Preece v. House. 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 1994) 
(citing Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994)). Unless there 
has been, "a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion and fundamental principles of 
fairness are flouted, [and] a court may, giving appropriate deference to legislative policy 
and the extraordinarily difficult duties of the Board of Pardons, intervene to correct such 
abuses by means of an appropriate extraordinary writ.'" State v. Barrett. 2005 UT 88, fl 
21 (citing Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677, 683-84 (Utah 1995)). The 
Court finds that the undisputed facts show the Board followed proper procedure and did 
not abuse its discretion nor did it impair petitioner's due process when it set petitioner's 
rehearing date for June 2014. 
The Court accepts petitioner's objection as sufficient to oppose respondent's 
motion, however petitioner sets forth no material disputes of fact. "When, as here, the 
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moving party 'challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to 
present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact" Gjustiv, 
stPrlinn WentworttLCopa,, 2009 UT 2, fl 53. 
Petitioner claims the hearing officer misstated his actual convictions and he was 
not allowed to present information to correct that misstatement. First, any confusion by 
the hearing officer is immaterial to whether the Board followed proper procedure or 
abused its discretion. The undisputed facts establish that petitioner was provided proper 
notice for the hearing and that the hearing was properly conducted. Petitioner may 
certainly present documents at his parole hearing, and when notice is proper those 
documents must be present at the hearing. I Itah R. Admin. Pro. R671-301-1. This rule 
does not entitle petitioner to present documents challenging the underlying convictions 
for which he is incarcerated. The hearing officer gave petitioner the opportunity to 
present a certified copy of any judgment, and petitioner told the hearing officer that he 
did not have it with him. Hir ing Transcript, at 7-8. Further, the hearing officer is not the 
ultimate decision maker, and his confusion, if any, is negated by the Board's ultimate 
parole decision based on the full record. The Board made its decision and set forth its 
rationale for the decision, and listed at least eight different reasons to support it. The 
affidavit of Curtis Garner, Chairman of the Utah State Board of Pardons and Parole, 
also makes clear that any confusion about the crimes at the hearing would have been 
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rectified during the Board's actual consideration of the full record of petitioner's crimes. 
Aff. of Curtis Garner, at H 8 -13 . The Board issued its rationale for decision citing 
several different reasons for its decision. Further, it granted and reconsidered all the 
evidence petitioner submitted in its Special Attention Review. 
When the Board properly makes and supports the decision, it meets the 
procedures, "[tjhe decision of the Board will be reached by a majority vote and reduced 
to writing, including a rationale for the decision." Utah R. Admin Prn R671-305-1 see 
also Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(1 )(a). The hearing officer only makes a 
recommendation and not a final decision. ]d. Petitioner's allegations that minor 
confusion and his own failure to properly bring documents to the hearing compromised 
the fairness of the hearing does not establish a genuine dispute of fact that the Board 
properly followed procedures and did not abuse its discretion. 
Petitioner's objection to the Board considering his pre-sentence report is also 
unfounded. It is not for the Court to evaluate the content of this report, but only to affirm 
that the pre-sentence report constitutes a portion of petitioner's record and is a fair basis 
from which to glean information about petitioner. Further, the pre-sentence report is 
Finally, the Court rejects petitioner's objection to the Board considering evidence 
and testimony from his victim at the hearing. A victim "may attend any hearing regarding 
the offender. A victim may testify during any hearing regarding the impact of the 
offense(s) upon the victim, and may present his views concerning any decision to be 
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made regarding the offender." Utah R. of Admin. Pro. R671-203-3; and see Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-27-9.5 (4) (a) - (c) (authorizing the same). It was entirely proper for the Board 
to allow petitioner's victim to speak at his parole hearing. 
Petitioner has not presented evidence or material facts that the Board exceeded 
its discretion nor that the Board committed any gross or flagrant abuse of power. 
Based on the foregoing, respondents' motion for summary judgment is hereby 
GRANTED. This is the final Order of the Court no further Order is required. 
DATED this /*- day of August 2009. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE T I 
?v n > 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling and 
Order, to the following, this _±_ day ofltiy72009: 
i V u j i ^ 
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ADDENDUM "D 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
APPEALED: CASE #20090720 
GARY L WELBORN vs. CURTIS GARNER 
CASE NUMBER 080923667 Post Conv Rel NonCap 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
ROYAL I HANSEN 
PARTIES 
Petitioner - GARY L WELBORN 
Respondent - CURTIS GARNER 
Respondent - KEITH HAMILTON 
Respondent - CHERYLN HANSON 
Respondent - CLARK HARMS 
Respondent - JESSE GALLEGOS 
Respondent - MEMBERS OF THE UTAH BOARD OF P 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
11-10-08 Filed: PETITION FOR WRIT OF EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF, MANDAMUS 
(VERIFIED) 
11-10-08 Filed: Complaint 
11-12-08 Judge SHEILA K MCCLEVE assigned. 
11-12-08 Note: Case referred to Judge McCleve. 
155 
155 
0 
0. 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
NO AMT S 
155. 
155. 
0. 
0. 
.00 
,00 
,00 
,00 
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11-17-08 Filed: Copy of Letter to Inmate Accounting Office requesting 
plaintiff's accounting. 
12-04-08 Filed: Account Statement 
12-30-08 Filed: Determination of Requirement to Pay Filing Fees 
returned. Address corrected and resent to Petitioner. 
01-08-09 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
01-08-09 Fee Account created Total Due: 155.00 
01-08-09 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 155.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S, Mail 
Payment; 
03-19-09 Filed: Letter from defendant 
04-20-09 Filed: Pro se motion to waive bon on undertaking 
Filed by: WELBORN, GARY L 
04-24-09 Filed order: Minute Entry 
Judge SHEILA K MCCLEVE 
Signed April 21, 2009 
04-24-09 Filed: Motion for Appointment of Counsel 
Filed by: WELBORN, GARY L 
04-30-09 Filed: Letter from Petitioner requesting copy of docket . Clerk 
mailed copy to defendant 4/28/09. 
05-11-09 Filed order: Minute Entry 
Judge SHEILA K MCCLEVE 
Signed May 08, 2009 
05-11-09 Note: Copy of contents of entire filed mailed to AG's office 
06-08-09 Filed: Motion for summary judgment 
06-08-09 Filed: Respondent's memorandum of points and authorities in 
support of their motion for summary judgment 
06-15-09 Filed: Pro se motion for summary judgement in favor of the 
petitioner 
06-25-09 Filed: Motion for 20 day Extension of Time 
06-30-09 Filed order: minute entry 
Judge SHEILA K MCCLEVE 
Signed June 30, 2009 
07-15-09 Filed: Motion m Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Strike 
Filed by: WELBORN, GARY L 
07-16-09 Filed: Respondents' reply memorandum 
07-16-09 Filed: memorandum in opposition to petitioner's motion to 
strike 
07-16-09 Filed: request to submit for decision 
07-16-09 Filed: motion for order allowing petitioner to respond to state 
response date 
07-29-09 Filed: Motion for order allowing petitioner to respond to 
states response dated 7-16-2009 and order staying states notice 
to submit for decision 
07-30-09 Filed: Response to State's Response on Petitioner's Motion to 
Strike and Request to Stay State's Notice to Submit for 
Decision 
07-30-09 Filed: Respondents' Objection to Petitioner's Motion to Allow a 
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Response 
08-11-09 Filed: Motion for judicial Notice 
08-11-09 Filed order: ORder on motion for summary judgment 
Judge ROBERT K HILDER 
Signed August 10, 2009 
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Note: 
Appeal 
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: Notice of Appeal 
Cert/Copy of Notice of Appeal 
is 
: Letter from Supreme Court to 
notice of appeal filed and assigned 
Note: 
Note: 
Appealed: Case #20090720 
Record indexed. Cert/copy of i 
20090720 
Judge 
Judge 
Note: 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON assigned. 
ROYAL I HANSEN assigned. 
Record Checked out to the AG's 
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Mr. \ 
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